Tackling Digitally Enabled Coercive Control

Investigation of the nature of digitally enabled coercive control, what policing responses exist and what improvements are needed, and what training and tools police officers need.

Report

Summary

This report provides an overview of the findings of an N8 PRP funded project conducted by Dr Antoinette Huber (PI) and Professor Barry Godfrey (Co-I), University of Liverpool, in partnership with Cumbria, Durham, and Merseyside Police forces. 

Key findings

Nature of DECC Digitally Enabled Coercive Control takes the form of harassment, digital deprivation/restriction, accessing the victim/survivor’s data, image-based abuse, and financial abuse. Digital and non-digital forms of abuse often appear together. Non-digital forms of abuse included physical damage, criminal damage, use of children, restriction of access/choice, harassment and stalking, and isolation. 

Incident identification By far, the biggest challenge faced by police forces in responding quickly to DECC is a lack of knowledge in identifying and understanding how to launch digital lines of inquiry. The data analysed showed that in a significant proportion of recorded incidents, DECC was mis-identified, or not identified at all (see recorded incidents section). This can lead to lines of investigation being missed, and misreporting of the scale of coercive control, and DECC. 

Record accuracy Some victim-survivors described how when reading statements later down the line, or in family court, the statements did not adequately capture the bigger picture or had significant omissions with regards to patterns of behaviour.

Speed of evidence collection Quick evidence collection is vital as there is high risk of deletion, or quick removal may be necessary (e.g. in cases of image-based abuse). 

Type of evidence collection There is an over-reliance on messages and call records, with insufficient planning on how to analyse huge volumes of data in a timely fashion. 

NPCC/CPS Guidance Currently, NPCC and CPS provide an evidence-gathering checklist which indicates what digital evidence might look like. There is confusion over the requirements for ‘live’ evidence, and waiting for police to collect live evidence can cause further harm to the victim-survivor by increasing the likelihood of further distribution and making it harder for images to be removed.

Digital Media Investigators Digital Media Investigators (DMIs) are critical resource but have limited capacity and cannot expiate the need for force-wide upskilling.

Role of Supervisors Supervisors were identified as potentially playing a key role in ensuring that digital lines of inquiry are not missed. Data identified that not all supervisors have enough knowledge of digital inquiries to fulfil this role and therefore, lines of inquiry continue to be missed.

Recommendations

Quick, accurate, transparent recording and evidence collection Possible offences need to be identified quickly, recorded accurately and transparently, and evidence seized as soon as possible.

• Call handlers should be trained on how to identify key signs of coercive control and to obtain initial digital information.
• First Responders need to be able to make the most of the ‘golden hour’ of evidence collection when called to an incident.
• Call handlers, first responders, and investigators must ensure that victim-survivors accounts are recorded correctly, and that the victim-survivor understands how their accounts are being recorded.

Investigating context and patterns Investigators should pay close attention to the context of incidents and look for patterns of behaviour. This includes:

• Home visits to look at which digital devices are being used and for other physical signs of coercive control (e.g. locks, holes in the walls).
• Awareness of how disabilities can be taken advantage of in coercive control contexts (e.g. removal of aids) and ensure that children are not asked to translate for deaf victim-survivors as this may prevent them from disclosing.
• Using police records of previous contact (including lower-level offences, incidents with different complainants, etc) to see if a pattern of abusive behaviour exists.
• NPCC and CPS should provide detailed guidance on the quality of evidence, e.g. how to balance the necessity of live evidence against the harm caused to the victim-survivor.
• Risk assessment and safeguarding tools (currently DASH and DARA) should include questions about use of digital devices to control the behaviour of the victim-survivor.

Training Recommendations

• Digital training should be embedded within basic training for new recruits. Police forces should aim for ‘digital policing’ to become standard policing practice.
• Specialist DMIs should be used to supplement an already high level of capability in response and investigative officers.
• Regular updates on digital lines of inquiry should be consistently rolled out to ensure that forces are up to date with the latest technological developments and changes, as well as latest information on what information service providers supply to law enforcement.
• Specialist digital teams such as digital forensics teams and DMIs should have access to regular CPD to ensure that they are able to keep abreast of changes and opportunities to digital lines of inquiry and how to execute these, include access to relevant software.
• Ideally, all CID officers would be trained up to DMI level and have some level of open-source training, however this may not be possible, and forces may opt for the use of dedicated DMIs to assist investigating officers.
• Supervisors should also be trained, at minimum, to the same level as detectives and preferably hold a DMI certification.

Minimum Training Requirements – Investigating Officers

1. identify the correct lines of inquiry, including what data can be collected from mobile phones, apps and other service providers and their windows of evidence collection,
2. identify relevant digital evidence patterns (i.e. victim-survivors behaviour patterns as well as perpetrators),
3. understand how to obtain the evidence they require (i.e LIMA and CycComms application forms and basic social media downloads),
4. how to use software available to them
5. how to review digital data.

Minimum Training Requirements – All Officers

1. identification of digital lines of inquiry,
2. knowledge on collecting basic/initial evidence collection (e.g. device information, telephone numbers, correct social media profile information, how to effectively take screenshots of communication (i.e. ensuring overlap between text messages to demonstrate no evidence tampering)
3. digital evidence preservation (including cloud storage),
4. initial checks of victim-survivor’s devices for potential evidence or risk (i.e. understanding location settings),
5. Understanding of how to use LIMA and CyComms applications to gather evidence;
6. information on support teams (e.g. open source teams, DMIs, Digital Teams) to ensure rapid evidence collection when necessary.

Report date: August 2024.

The research was conducted by Dr Antoinette Huber (PI) and Professor Barry Godfrey (Co-I), University of Liverpool, in partnership with Cumbria, Durham, and Merseyside Police forces. For more information, please contact Dr Antoinette Huber, a.huber@liverpool.ac.uk